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ASHCROFT v. IQBAL: THE
QUESTION OF A HEIGHTENED
STANDARD OF PLEADING IN
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASES
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court will decide the pleading
requirement that a complainant must meet in order to bring a viable
claim against high-ranking government officials1 for their
subordinates’ allegedly unconstitutional actions. The case marks an
intersection between the liberal pleading rules of federal procedure
and the qualified immunity generally provided to high government
officials. On June 14, 2007, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part a decision by the Eastern District of New York
denying the motions to dismiss of several current and former
government officials from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
including Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), including Director of the FBI Robert Mueller,
and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).2
Following his arrest by the FBI and Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”), Iqbal, a Muslim originally from
Pakistan, was designated as a “high interest” detainee and separated
3
from the general jail population. Despite the four arguments for

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Generally, “high-ranking officials” does not have a specific definition, but courts have
used their discretion in differentiating these senior officers from those “front-line officials” who
have access to less confidential information. Due to their access to sensitive information, district
courts subject high-ranking officials only to tightly controlled discovery, and only after discovery
of front-line individuals has demonstrated a need for further discovery from higher ranking
officials. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 147.
3. Id. at 147–48.
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reversal put forward by the defendants, the Second Circuit held that
Iqbal established a genuine claim that should continue to discovery
without meeting the stricter pleading standard the government
4
officials argued was needed to overcome their qualified immunity.
In finding the defendants’ “qualified immunity defense”
insufficient to justify the case’s early dismissal, the Second Circuit
made two important holdings. The first holding found that based on
conflicting signals between the Supreme Court’s Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
5
6
Twombly holding and that case’s progeny, courts should apply a
flexible “plausibility standard” for pleadings. This is not a heightened
pleading standard for all cases, but is rather a standard applied at the
court’s discretion. The court can request that a pleader support his
claim with additional factual allegations where the court determines
some amplification is needed to make the claim plausible.7 Secondly,
the court held that for pleading purposes, the supervisors’ personal
involvement in the harsh treatment of the detainee was sufficient to
impute to them knowledge of the policies and procedures concerning
the arrest and detention of detainees in the New York federal system.8
On June 16, 2008, the Supreme Court granted government
officials Ashcroft and Mueller’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
determine whether Iqbal’s conclusory complaint that the high-ranking
officers’ condoned alleged unconstitutional acts committed by their
subordinates is sufficient to state a claim against the high-ranking
officials or whether the allegation should be dismissed at the
preliminary stage because of the policy underlying officials’ qualified
immunity defense.9

4. Id. at 178.
5. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168, 69 (1993) (finding the courts have a duty to weed out unmeritorious claims
before discovery)); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (holding that plaintiff does not
have to present clear and convincing evidence of improper motive in order to defeat an official’s
motion for summary judgment).
7. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–158.
8. Id. at 166.
9. Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (mem.) (June 16, 2008)
(No. 07-1015).
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II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the months after 9/11, all Arab or Muslim men arrested in the
New York City area on criminal or immigration charges were
classified as “high interest” until the FBI concluded an investigation
10
of the allegations against them. This practice resulted in several men
being detained for months without evidence linking them to 9/11 or
11
any other terrorist plot.
Plaintiff Iqbal is a Muslim from Pakistan who was arrested a few
weeks after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York
12
City and Washington, D.C. Following his arrest, Iqbal was placed in
the general population of a Brooklyn jail until January 8, 2002, when
he was assigned to a special section of the jail reserved for “high
interest” detainees. There, he was subjected to the most restrictive
type of control available within the jail.13
Iqbal’s complaint alleges that during his time in the high-security
section of the prison, he was kept in solitary confinement, was not
supplied with adequate food, was left in the rain for extended periods
of time, had his prayers interrupted, had his conversations with an
attorney interrupted, and was brutally beaten by guards when he
protested a fourth consecutive strip and body cavity search.14 Iqbal
spent six months in the prison’s high-security ward before being
released back into the general prison population after ultimately
pleading guilty to two conspiracy charges.15
In 2004, Iqbal16 sued Attorney General Ashcroft, Director of the
FBI Mueller, seven other federal officials, various prison staff, and the
United States for twenty-one claims, including religious
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, and various Eighth Amendment
claims such as interference with his conferences with counsel.17 The
defendants moved to dismiss Iqbal’s action for four reasons: (1) the

10. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148.
11. Id.
12. Id., at 147–48.
13. Id. at 148.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id.
16. Following the Eastern District’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, co-plaintiff
Elmaghraby’s claims against the United States were settled for $300,000. Thus, Elmaghraby’s
claims will not be at issue in the appeal. Id. at 147.
17. Id. at 149–50 n.3.
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action was “precluded by special factors,” namely the post-9/11
context; (2) the defendants were all protected by “qualified
immunity”; (3) the doctrine of respondeat superior did not extend to
the supervisory defendants; and (4) some of the defendants were not
18
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of New York.
The district court denied Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s motions to
dismiss and they appealed on the basis of the second argument—
19
qualified immunity. The two officers appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which held that Iqbal’s complaint sufficiently stated
20
a claim against the federal officials. Defendants Ashcroft and
Mueller then appealed to the Supreme Court.21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Ashcroft v. Iqbal has a complicated genealogy due to the breadth
of the issues on appeal. The first issue is the applicability of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which
allows private causes of action against government officials for
violating certain constitutional rights.22 The “Bivens suit” is a unique
cause of action stemming from the fact that officials inherently pose a
greater threat to individuals’ rights than do private persons, thus
justifying the federal courts’ use of broad discretion crafting relief to
remedy constitutional wrongs at the hands of government officials.23
As the Bivens opinion notes, because the availability of a qualified
immunity defense was not decided by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court did not address the applicability of the defense.24 But,
as the majority implied, the qualified immunity defense question
25
would eventually require discussion.
A line of cases followed that considered whether a plaintiff must
meet an enhanced pleading standard—beyond that of the notice

18. Id. at 150.
19. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
20. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 143.
21. Id. at 151.
22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 389 (1971) (holding that a search and arrest of plaintiffs’ private residence made without
probable cause and by federal agents acting under the color of his authority gives rise to a
private cause of action for damages due to the agents’ unconstitutional conduct).
23. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , 684 (1946).
24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397–98.
25. Id.
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26
pleading dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure —in order
to defeat the presumption of qualified immunity that typically
protects government officials.27 The qualified immunity discussions in
these cases tended to reach similar conclusions: where a supervisory
position is sufficient to absolve a defendant of liability based on
qualified immunity, efforts to expand pleading requirements in any
manner without a congressional amendment to the Federal Rules
have failed.28

A. The Basics of Bivens Suits
The resolution of Iqbal’s issue of whether conclusory allegations
fulfill the pleading standards against high-ranking officials will greatly
aid federal courts in defining the outermost borders of a Bivens cause
of action.29 Though the holding in Bivens dealt specifically with
establishing a private cause of action against federal officers for
violations of Fourth Amendment rights,30 the Court has also allowed
31
Bivens suits in cases involving violations of the Eighth Amendment.
Generally, the facts required in pleadings are governed by Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8(a)(2),
conclusory allegations are sufficient to overcome a motion to
dismiss.32 The law remains unsettled, however, as to whether a
heightened pleading standard is required in Bivens actions,
particularly when the defendant establishes a “qualified immunity
defense” and the allegations are limited to supervisory involvement,
racial or religious animus, or conspiracy.33
Establishing the pleading requirements in a qualified immunity
case is necessary to preserve the very existence of the doctrine, the

26. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain, in relevant part, “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2).
27. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
28. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 554.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (Feb. 6, 2008) (No. 071015).
30. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
31. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (finding that a Bivens action was allowed
in an Eighth Amendment case, even where it would not be sustained under normal tort law).
32. Supra, note 26.
33. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir. 2007).

DO NOT DELETE

4/15/2009 11:54:50 AM

380 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:375

purpose of which is to protect high-level government officials from
34
unnecessary interference with the performance of their duties.
Rather than creating a mere defense to liability, qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense to a law suit even being entertained by a court,
but it is waived if not asserted during the preliminary proceedings of a
trial.35 Because the Court has not clearly delineated how the Bivens
doctrine and qualified immunity interact, the Second Circuit dealt
with seemingly conflicting precedent when it analyzed whether
conclusory allegations in a pleading suffice to overcome the qualified
36
immunity defense.
This unsettled gap in the law is evident when one considers the
37
Second Circuit’s application of Colon v. Coughlin in the case at hand.
In Colon, the Second Circuit allowed a prisoner to assert a private
cause of action against a state prison commissioner alleging a
conspiracy by local prison officials.38 The court permitted the action
even though the complaint set forth no facts connecting the prison
commissioner to the supposed conspiracy or suggesting deficient
training of the prison officials.39 The court held that the personal
involvement of a supervisor can be established with evidence that the
supervisor “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom . . . or the [supervisor] exhibited deliberate indifference to the
rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.”40
Similarly, the Second Circuit allowed Iqbal to use a constructive
notice theory to sue high-level government supervisors for their
subordinates’ unconstitutional actions. This theory enabled Iqbal to
establish Ashcroft and Mueller’s personal involvement in the actions
based solely on their positions of authority and, according to Iqbal,
take them outside the aegis of the qualified immunity doctrine.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 541 (1985) (Stevens, J. concurring).
Id., at 526.
Hasty, 490 F.3d at 155–57.
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 873.
Id.; Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1986).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of a Heightened Pleading Standard
Requirement
In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, the Supreme Court found that it would be
“impossible to square [a] ‘heightened pleading standard’ [for qualified
immunity] . . . with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set by the
Federal Rules.”41 Leatherman recognized that the Federal Rules
provided specific instances in which greater particularity than the
“short plain statement” could be required in a complaint. Because
neither of the specific instances involved the claim brought by the
claimants, the Court refused to apply the greater particularity
42
standard. Emphasizing the Court’s history of refusing to interpret
the federal pleading rules beyond their express language,43 Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion stressed the federal courts’ role in using
summary judgment and control of discovery to “weed out”
unmeritorious claims.44 This characterization of the judiciary’s role in
controlling litigation can be extended to support the maintenance of
the qualified immunity doctrine’s integrity via summary judgment and
discovery, thus sidestepping the specific procedure of amending the
Federal Rules.
Five years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question again
in Crawford-El v. Britton and rejected a heightened pleading standard
for a prisoner’s claim seeking damages from a correctional officer for
a constitutional claim requiring proof of improper motive—malice.45
The Court determined that the complainant does not have to produce
evidence of improper motive at the pleading stage to defeat a motion
of summary judgment. Instead, the Court opted to protect
government officials at a later stage in the proceedings by requiring a
heightened standard of proof for cases based solely on malice, thereby
emphasizing the courts’ abilities to tailor discovery under Rule 26
rather than their power to dismiss a claim in summary judgment.46 The
Court’s holding that “‘bare allegations of malice’ cannot overcome

41. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
44. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
45. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 577 (1998).
46. Id. at 588 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)).
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the qualified immunity defense” maintained the protection afforded
officials by employing the very tools Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined
in Leatherman.
More recently the Court made its most direct ruling on the
pleading standard for qualified immunity cases in Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema. In Swierkiewicz, the Court not only held that a heightened
pleading standard was inapplicable to an employment discrimination
plaintiff, but also that a “requirement of greater specificity for
particular claims is a result that must be obtained by the process of
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”47 This
holding continues to emphasize the concerns put forward by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Leatherman and the Court’s commitment to
respecting the traditional Rules’ amendment process before the Court
imposes a higher pleading standard than the standard currently
required.48 Although the Court has not reconsidered its position since
Swierkiewicz, a circuit split regarding the pleading required to
overcome the qualified immunity remains.
C. “Plausibility” and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
The Court’s most recent developments regarding the standard for
assessing the adequacy of pleadings occurred in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, which involved the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of
an antitrust case brought by consumers against incumbent local
phone companies.49 The question in Bell Atlantic was whether a
Section 1 Sherman Act antitrust complaint requires a heightened
50
pleading standard. Generally, liability under the Sherman Act
requires a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The complaint, however,
alleged only “consciously parallel behavior” between the defendants,
suggesting that a conspiracy was likely.51 The Court held that to
withstand a motion to dismiss the underlying pleading must contain
enough facts to suggest that a conspiracy to restrict trade existed.52
The Court averred that this holding did not impose a heightened

47. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 544 (2007).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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pleading standard counter to precedent, but instead fulfilled the
intentions of the Federal Rules by only allowing claims with “enough
53
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Despite the Court’s assurance that it did not make a substantive
change to the pleading standard and its suggestion that Bell Atlantic
may be inapplicable to cases outside of antitrust, the use of a new
“plausibility” standard, rather than the more objective “short, plain
statement,” involved an interpretation of the Federal Rules in
general.54
Unfortunately, the Court has not fully defined what facts make a
claim “plausible” except by stating that it is not the heightened
standard specifically rejected in Swierkiwicz.55 Because the Court
chose to define the “plausibility” in general and negative terms, the
scope of Swierkiwicz’s application to non-antitrust pleadings,
including how the courts should use the “plausibility” standard during
the preliminary proceedings of Bivens claims, remains undefined.
Certainly, questions remain as to how the Court may apply
“plausibility” without judicial rulemaking.
IV. HOLDING
56

In Iqbal v. Hasty, the Second Circuit held that Iqbal’s complaint
stated a substantive due process claim against the federal officials
involved, including Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director
Mueller, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.57 The defendant
government officers argued that Iqbal’s allegations did not allege they
acted with sufficient “personal involvement” and that the allegations
were too conclusory to overcome the qualified immunity defense.58

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The district court dismissed the claims against Hasty and the other BOP defendants.
Therefore, Hasty and the others were not parties to the Supreme Court appeal.
57. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit also made several
other holdings that were not considered by the Supreme Court: (1) 9/11 and the emergency
circumstances surrounding Iqbal’s detainment did not lessen his established constitutional
rights; (2) Iqbal’s procedural due process rights were not clearly established; and (3) the prison
warden was not entitled to qualified immunity defense for certain aspects of the complaint. Id.
58. Id. at 151. Again, the appeal also dealt with the qualified immunity defense on the basis
that the allegations “do not allege the violation of a clearly established right,” and “the
defendants actions were objectively reasonable.” Id. While a finding of either of these bases
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The argument, however, was unsuccessful due to the court’s
interpretation of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly’s “plausibility standard.”
The Second Circuit found Bell Atlantic provided an insufficient basis
for the defendants’ argument that a heightened pleading standard is
59
required when the qualified immunity defense has been invoked.
First, the court explicitly denied that the Bell Atlantic
“plausibility” requirement creates a universal standard of heightened
pleading. Instead, the standard allows a court, on a case-by-case basis,
to request a pleader to add facts to the claim if the court finds such
60
amplification needed to render the claim plausible. Even though the
court held that Bell Atlantic, in “its full force, is limited to the antitrust
context,”61 it found that the language of the opinion, when taken as a
whole, suggested a desire by the Supreme Court to alter pleading
standards, although in a limited fashion.62 Therefore, the Second
Circuit chose to adopt Bell Atlantic as applicable to Iqbal.63
The court went on to hold that the allegations against the
government officers were sufficient to establish their personal
involvement in the alleged discriminatory conduct because the
officers “condoned the [challenged] policy.”64 Essentially, the court
again attempted to apply Bell Atlantic by stating “it is plausible to
believe that senior officials of the Department of Justice would be
aware of policies concerning the detention of those arrested by
federal officers.”65 The court held that it was also plausible that the
senior officials “would know about, condone, or otherwise have
personal involvement” in the manner in which these detention
policies were actually enforced.66
Although the court applied Bell Atlantic in its attempt to find
“plausibility,” its use of the phrase “personal involvement” invokes
the Second Circuit’s earlier holding in Colon v. Coughlin, which
defined the rules for establishing personal involvement—i.e., creating

would be dispositive, neither is being considered on certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (Feb. 6, 2008) (No. 07-1015), cert granted.
59. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158.
60. Id. at 157–58 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 157.
62. Id. at 155–56.
63. Id. at 157–58.
64. Id. at 165.
65. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 166.
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a policy under which unconstitutional practices occurred or exhibiting
67
deliberate indifference to the inmates’ rights). These precedents are
not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the attempt in one sentence to
combine the Bell Atlantic and Colon lines of cases only emphasizes
the gap between them.68
Despite acknowledging that neither Ashcroft nor Mueller were
personally involved in the decision to classify Iqbal as a “high
interest” detainee, the court determined that their lack of actual
decision-making did not insulate the two supervisory officials from
69
liability. As a result, Iqbal could sue Ashcroft and Mueller, despite
their qualified immunity defenses, without even implying that either
official was actually involved in the decisions that violated his
70
constitutional rights. This determination was made despite Harlow v.
Fitzgerald’s requirement that “‘bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.’”71 Rather than relying on
the language of Harlow, the court emphasized the language of
Crawford-El v. Britton, distinguishing Harlow on the basis that there
is no malice alleged in or required by Iqbal’s claim and observing that
other mechanisms exist to protect higher officials.72 As a result, the
court held that Harlow did not impose a heightened pleading
73
standard for persons making Bivens claims.
The Second Circuit recognized the general need for the qualified
immunity defense and the potential threat to that defense posed by
adhering to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than using a
74
heightened pleading standard. The court emphasized that, upon
remand, the district court “‘must exercise its discretion in a way that
protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense . . . so that
officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery
or trial proceedings.’”75 Essentially, the Second Circuit sought to make
67. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing a private cause of action
against high-ranking government officials based on a constructive notice theory).
68. See supra Part III.A (describing the uncertainty surrounding the application of
qualified immunity in Bivens suits).
69. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 166.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 154 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)).
72. Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1998)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. (quoting Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597–98) (emphasis in original)).
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summary judgment readily available to high-level officials, but not at
76
the pleading stage.
V. ANALYSIS
The Iqbal v. Hasty decision poses several theoretical and practical
problems. First, the Second Circuit’s decision to expand Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly beyond its literal antitrust scope to create a general
pleading rule contradicts the policy represented by the less explicit
and less burdensome pleading requirements permitted to establish
supervisors’ personal liability in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Without delving into the details of
Bivens and its progeny, the court’s decision evinces the legal
complications that the panel faced in applying the holding in Bell
Atlantic to Iqbal. Rather than applying Harlow v. Fitzgerald and
limiting Crawford-El v. Britton to its facts, the court invoked the
Supreme Court’s language used to distinguish Harlow from
Crawford-El to hold both that other mechanisms exist to protect
high-ranking officials from unmeritorious action besides early
dismissal and that Harlow sought only to protect against “broad77
reaching” discovery. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court provided no
guidance to help determine the difference between the “broadreaching” discovery against which courts are supposed to protect
government officials and “broad discretion” in the discovery process
that is supposedly a more equitable method by which to balance
competing interests.78
The application of Crawford-El to the facts of Iqbal results in two
problematic outcomes. First, by imposing an ambiguous plausibility
standard and by putting greater weight on the need for discovery than
on the potential damage to the ability of higher officials to perform
their national security duties, the Second Circuit risks stripping the
implied immunity defense of much of its protective powers. Second,
by ordering the district court to limit discovery on remand, the
Second Circuit lengthens the discovery process, thereby increasing the
cost to the parties. Considering the difficulty of establishing a case
against supervisory parties, there seems to be no need to increase

76. Id.
77. Id. at 154.
78. Id. at 154–55.
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costs. Because of the limitations on discovery against high-ranking
official, the process is not likely to lead to any facts clearly
establishing personal involvement without risking substantial
interference with Ashcroft’s or Mueller’s ability to perform their
duties. There is also the risk that highly sensitive information may be
leaked as a result of the discovery process.
This decision could have the practical consequence of permitting
unsubstantiated allegations of constructive knowledge to defeat the
qualified immunity defense and, even more worrisome to the nation’s
national security, could lead to inquiry into the subjective motives of
high-officials in privileged positions. Not only is national security a
major concern, but the high-ranking officials entrusted with
maintaining this security are particularly susceptible targets for
litigation. Therefore, the Second Circuit’s holding, once applied, would
be difficult to limit to this case’s facts, leading to a significant increase
in litigation involving high-profile government officials. These
problems could be contained somewhat if Iqbal stands for the
proposition that trial courts must limit discovery in these cases, but
this seems to be a poor solution when one considers the potential
risks should any privileged information guarded by the offices of the
Attorney General or Director of the FBI leak to the general public.
Second, the Circuit Court’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic creates
more confusion than it remedies. Rather than taking the Supreme
Court at its word and dismissing cases when the complaint contained
no more than bare allegations and legal conclusions, the Second
Circuit lifted various quotations from Bell Atlantic, took them out of
context, and split them into two categories: one pointing toward a
heightened pleading standard and the other limiting Bell Atlantic to
establishing a plausibility standard.79 Although it used these
categories, the Second Circuit decided to follow Bell Atlantic but not
80
technically classify it as a heightened pleading standard; therefore it
did not entirely accept either of the two categories it delineated.
The most troubling question is whether the Bell Atlantic
“plausibility” standard actually requires more specific pleadings than
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require. Though Iqbal
emphasized that Bell Atlantic does not impose a more demanding

79. Id. at 155–57.
80. Id. at 158.
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pleading standing, the Second Circuit seemed to acknowledge that,
in some circumstances, the plausibility standard requires plaintiffs to
“supplement” normal notice pleading under the Federal Rules and
82
Conley v. Gibson. If a “supplement” to the default standard does not
heighten the standard, what does?

VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
A. Strengths & Weaknesses of Defendants’ Case
The strengths of the defendants’ case are largely outlined above.
Essentially, their arguments emphasized increasing efficiency, creating
unity across the circuits, and maintaining the strength of the qualified
immunity defense for national security reasons, particularly in light of
the War on Terrorism and the weaknesses in national security shown
by the 9/11 attacks.
The defendants focused on the merits of a heightened pleading
standard emphasized by the Second Circuit’s decision: first, that the
heightened standard is essential to allow officials to carry out their
roles without fear of constant litigation, particularly in fact patterns
such as in Iqbal v. Hasty where the only connection petitioners have
to the alleged action is constructive notice; and second, that allowing
these cases to go forward facilitates the broad-ranging discovery that
the qualified immunity defense is meant to prevent.83
Despite the strong set of interests presented by Ashcroft and
Mueller, the Court must consider the competing interests that
supports denying a heightened pleading standard in qualified
immunity situations. Unlimited immunity would free government
officials to indirectly order subordinates to commit constitutional
violations and would support less oversight by these officials when
supervising their various branches.
B. Strengths & Weaknesses of Iqbal’s Case
The strength of Iqbal’s case stems primarily from the
constitutional claims at issue. Iqbal’s complaint alleges violations of

81. Id.
82. Id. at 177.
83. Id. at 158.
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his freedom to practice his religion, his right to an attorney, and
various other types of discrimination that violate rights considered
84
fundamental to the American ideal. Complainants like Iqbal, who
are kept in solitary confinement and have very little access to
information, would find it incredibly difficult to reach discovery if
they had to allege information directly implicating officials like
Ashcroft and Mueller whose personal involvement can only be
established through the creation or condoning of a general policy.
Iqbal can argue that by refusing to allow these types of cases to
progress to discovery, the Court would have to find that higher
officials are granted carte blanche discretion when creating
unconstitutional policies as long as their subordinates actually
institute the offending policies. Iqbal’s argument would, however, face
the difficulty that the Second Circuit did not rely heavily on Colon v.
Caughlin—allowing a private suit of action against high-ranking
government officials based on a constructive notice theory—in
making its holding in Iqbal, so it is less likely that the Supreme Court
will rely on Colon to resolve Iqbal’s case. Generally, the weaknesses
of the plaintiff’s case mirror the strengths of the defendants’ case.
C. Likely Disposition
As of April 12, 2009, the Supreme Court had still not reached a
decision on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, although oral argument was heard on
85
December 10, 2008. It is likely the Supreme Court will hold that the
complaint was not sufficient to defeat the defense of qualified
immunity held by high-level government officials acting in their
official capacities. Because of the very high rank of the officers in
question and the sensitive nature of their duties, the Court probably
will find that allowing this case to advance to further discovery would
more likely expose confidential information to the public than reveal
Ashcroft’s or Mueller’s actual knowledge of the unconstitutional
behavior of their subordinates. This balance of interests comprises the
very reason for maintaining a qualified immunity defense.
Although the Supreme Court limited the application of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald in Crawford-El v. Britton, the broad concept of supervisory

84. Id. at 149–50, n.3.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 U.S. 2931 (Dec. 10, 2008) (No. 071015).
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liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics coupled with the lenient pleading standard
suggested by the Second Circuit would undermine the qualified
immunity defense to a degree that would be counter to previous
decisions by the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit succeeded in
creating a confusing pleading standard that is not universally
“heightened” beyond the Federal Rules’s standard, but one that can
be essentially heightened at the judge’s discretion. That the Second
Circuit did not decide that a heightened pleading standard should be
imposed on claims facing a qualified immunity defense will likely
allow the Court to maintain the boundaries of qualified immunity
defense, at least in this limited context.

